Above the Law?
Above the Law?
If you have complaints about attorney dishonest acts, your state should have an Office of Disciplinary Counsel which you can file a formal complaint requesting an investigation into the matter. Any reviewing authority is required to recuse themselves if there is any conflict of interest. The state Office Disciplinary Counsel should have the blank forms that are printable for you to complete with your complaint information.
Hopefully this Breached Justice web site has informed you the reader that if you were involved in litigation the documents in your case are more than likely published in pacer records. I attached all the now established material facts to my complaints in proof of very serious misconduct by multiple attorneys.
Your state may have a client assistance fund that may reimburse clients who have suffered losses due attorneys dishonest acts.
In Louisiana almost anyone who has lost money due to a lawyer’s dishonesty can apply for reimbursement. You do not have to be United States citizen. Search your state Office Disciplinary Counsel or State Bar Association to see whether their is the possibility of your recovery of damages.
You be the Judge -here is what I found
Judges Do Not Have Immunity for Criminal Acts
Courts have repeatedly ruled that judges have no immunity for their criminal acts. (O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 503 (1974).)
Judges have no immunity for crimes committed by them during the terms of their office or prior thereto. United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974). (See also Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 429, 47 L. Ed. 2d 128, 96 S. Ct. 984 (1976); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 627, 33 L. Ed. 2d 583, 92 S. Ct. 2614 (1972); United States v. DiCarlo, 565 F.2d 802, 806 (1977); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, supra at 581, United States v. Craig, 573 F.2d 513 (7th Cir. 03/22/1978); United States v. Anzelmo, 319 F. Supp. 1106, 1118-19 (E.D. La. 1970).
No federal official has ever been held exempt from prosecution for his commission of a federal crime. (United States v. Manton, 107 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1938); United States v. Gillock, 587 F.2d 284 (6th Cir. 11/01/1978).)
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Circuit Court of Cook County is a criminal enterprise under the RICO Act. (U.S. v. Murphy, 768 F.2d 1518, 1531 (7th Cir. 1985).) [emphasis added.]
The United States Supreme Court acknowledged the judicial corruption in Cook County, when it stated that Judge “Maloney was one of many dishonest judges exposed and convicted through ‘Operation Greylord’, a labyrinthine federal investigation of judicial corruption in Chicago.” (Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 117 S.Ct. 1793 (U.S. 06/09/1997).
Turning the pages of history, the Supreme Court said in an 1882 decision, United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220, that: “No man in this country is so high that he is above the law. No officer of the law may set that law as defiance with impunity. All the officers of the government, from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law, and are bound to obey it. It is the only supreme power in our system of government and every man who my accepting office participates in its functions is only the more strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of the authority which it gives.”
In Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. 74, Mr. Justice Douglas said in his dissenting opinion, Ibid. at 140: “If they [federal judges] break a law, they can be prosecuted.” Mr. Justice Black in his dissent said, Ibid. at 141, that “* * * judges, like other people, can be tried, convicted, and punished for crimes * * *.”
In United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, a Senator was charged with a § 201 violation. The trial court held that the Speech or Debate Clause precluded criminal prosecution. The Supreme Court reversed and found no constitutional violation. The Court said, 408 U.S. at 520:
Finally, we have O’Shea v. Littleton, decided January 15, 1974. The Court said: “…we have never held that the performance of the duties of judicial, legislative, or executive officers, requires or contemplates the immunization of otherwise criminal deprivations of constitutional rights. Cf. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880). On the contrary, the judicially fashioned doctrine of official immunity does not reach “so far as to immunize criminal conduct proscribed by an Act of Congress. . . .” Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 627 (1972).
We conclude that whatever immunities or privileges the Constitution confers for the purpose of assuring the independence of the co-equal branches of government they do not exempt the member of those branches “from the operation of the ordinary criminal laws.” Criminal conduct is not part of the necessary functions performed by public officials. Punishment for that conduct will not interfere with the legitimate operations of a branch of government. Historically, the impeachment process has proven to be cumbersome and fraught with political overtones. We believe that the independence of the judiciary is better served when criminal charges against its members are tried in a court rather than in Congress. With a court trial, a judge assured of the protections given to all those charged with criminal conduct. The issues are heard in a calm and reasoned manner and are subject to the rules of evidence, the presumption of innocence, and other safeguards. (United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 at 519-520.)
On the basis of the text of the Constitution, its background, its contemporaneous construction, and the pragmatic consequences of its provisions on impeachment, we are convinced that a federal judge is subject to indictment and trial before impeachment and that the district court had jurisdiction to try defendant Kerner. (United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir. 02/19/1974).)